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Abstract:  
Providing a concise working definition of social capital, this conceptual paper analyses why social 
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trust, participation, and inclusion, are created when a matrix of various social relations is combined 
with particular normative and cognitive social institutions that facilitate cooperation and reciprocity. 
Such a matrix of social relations, plus facilitating institutions, is what the paper defines as “social 
capital”. The paper further suggests that social capital is formed at the regional (rather than national 
or international) level, because it is at this level we find the densest matrices of social relations. The 
paper also offers a discussion of how regional policies may be suited for promoting social capital. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This conceptual paper discusses the importance of social capital (e.g. Bourdieu, 
1986; Coleman 1988, Burt 1992, Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Woolcock 1998; 
Baron et al, 2001; Lin, 2001 Lin et al, 2001, Field, 2003) for localized learning 
(i.e., processes of technological and institutional development taking place within 
confined regional spaces, such as clusters, as described by e.g. Malmberg and 
Maskell (1999); Lorenzen (2001); and Maskell (2001)). 
Increasingly, scholars argue that persistent economic development differences 
among regions may be understood by focusing upon social capital. In a resource-
based view of regional economic development (see e.g. Foss, 1996; Maskell et al, 
1998; Lorenzen, 2002), unique resource endowments of regions cause persistent 
differences of firm performances, exports, and economic growth. Obviously, 
regions’ different locations, natural resource endowments, access to public or 
private venture capital, public educational programs or knowledge transfers from 
universities often hugely influence their growth potential. However, taking all 
these resources into account is not sufficient to explain e.g. the persistent growth 
differences between Italian regions or Indian states, the emergence of successful 
clusters in hitherto predominantly rural areas around the World, or the success of 
some regions in restructuring their old industrial areas under the same conditions 
where others fail miserably.1 Hence, some scholars argue that social capital is the 
“residue” that may explain these regional performance differences, after we have 
taken other resource endowments into account.2 In particular, social capital may 
facilitate learning at the regional level, and hence lead to product innovations and 
over-average export potential of local firms (Maskell et al., 1998; Lorenzen, 
2002).  
The empirical evidence on the importance of social capital is still sparse (but see 
Borgatti, 1986; Lin et al., 2001; Putnam, 2001). Hence, what follows is a 
conceptual exercise, through which I shall investigate and further develop the 
social capital thesis, with particular focus upon technological and institutional 
dynamics. 
With the rise of the Knowledge Economy (OECD, 1996; Lundvall and Maskell, 
2000), traditional economic efficiencies of production (revolving around cost-
cutting and stability) are giving way to efficiencies of learning, and that means a 
shift in economic organization: The abundance of flexible and temporary market-
based forms of organization (i.e., shifting inter-firm relations and projects) is 
growing relative to integrated and stable forms (i.e., large firms and long-term 
networks). The paper argues that these developments render social capital 
increasingly valuable, because social capital organizes markets, serving as a 
social framework allowing business firms to flexibly connect and reconnect and 
learn in both breadth and depth.  
The paper does not attempt at treating all aspects of the increasingly popular ⎯  
and blurry ⎯  notion of social capital. Rather, providing a concise working 
                                          
1 In development theory, scholars increasingly look for involvement, social ties, and so on, as 
explanations to economic development differences, rather than trade regimes or government 
programs (Hirschman, 1986, Miller 1997). Another case in point is the rise of the Scandinavian welfare 
societies from being a part of the underdeveloped periphery of Europe to reach a GDP per capita among 
the highest in the world, while other European countries with a much stronger resource endowment 
lagged behind (Lundvall and Maskell, 2000).  
2 Hall and Jones (1997) refer to “social infrastructures”, and Abramovitz (1986) use the expression 
“social capability”. In economics, the idea of a social or institutional “residue” is not new either (see 
e.g. Perroux, 1988).  
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definition of social capital, the paper analyses why it is important for learning, 
regional competitiveness, and economic development, why it has a regional 
dimension, and how it is created. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides a workable definition of social capital. With other scholars, I suggest that 
a range of regional social phenomena arising from cooperative and reciprocal 
behavior, such as altruism, trust, participation, and inclusion, are preconditioned 
by the existence of social relations among agents (firms and persons) based upon 
particular social institutions (shared conventions and codebooks). A dense 
amalgamation of different types of social relations and conventions cum 
codebooks is what the paper defines as “social capital”. Hence, contrary to some 
other scholars, I view trust and other benevolent social phenomena as outcomes 
of social capital, not parts of it. Furthermore, I emphasize the collective, non-
proprietary dimension of social capital (as opposed to scholars who focus upon 
single agents’ or clubs’ appropriation of the benefits of their social relations). I 
also emphasize the diversity, openness, and social change social capital allows for 
(contrary to scholars who view social capital as a stable phenomenon serving 
mainly to preserve established social traditions, and who sometimes refer to 
“negative” social capital).  
Section 3 takes as a ⎯  admittedly stylized ⎯  starting point that competitiveness 
in the Knowledge Economy hinges upon technological learning. It proceeds to 
analyze the impact of social capital upon such learning. I argue that social capital 
facilitates interactive learning among business firms, because it lowers their 
incentive-related as well as cognitive coordination costs. Social capital is arguably 
an economically efficient frame for technological learning, because it offers a 
particularly diverse and flexible combination of knowledge resources. 
Section 4 is devoted to a discussion of why stocks of social capital are often 
formed at the regional (rather than national or international) level. I point out 
that it is at the regional level we find the densest configurations of tight and 
loose, as well as business-related and civic social relations ⎯  in other words, a 
regional matrix of different types of social relations, offering a wide and flexible 
frame for social interaction and learning processes. Hence, institutional learning, 
bringing about (and adapting) social conventions and codebooks to further 
broaden the matrix of relations, is a predominantly regional phenomenon.  
While a regional setting is necessary for social capital formation, it is clearly not 
sufficient: While some regions build large stocks of social capital and 
consequently experience growth in the Knowledge Economy, others lag behind. 
Section 5 offers a discussion of why particular regions become richer in social 
capital than others. The section distinguishes between organic processes of social 
capital accumulation, and policy processes of targeted investments in social 
capital.  
The paper is rounded off by a conclusion and brief discussion of how our 
discussion of social capital has added to a conceptualization of localized learning. 
 
 
2. A Definition of Social Capital 
 
Social capital defined  
In recent literature, social capital has been assumed to mean a lot of different 
things, and a certain amount of terminological soup persists (for a discussion, see 
Woolcock, 1998). For example, altruism, trust, participation to different social 
activities (e.g. voluntary social work, leisure, or education), social inclusion, and 
low crime levels, have all been dubbed “social capital”. Even if most of these 
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social traits are obviously benevolent and important for economic development, 
and some of them are relatively easy to measure empirically (Putnam, 2001), 
they seem to be picked rather arbitrarily, and whether and how they are 
connected remains unclear.  
For my purpose, I shall view trust and other benevolent social phenomena as 
outcomes of social capital, not parts of it and revert to the relatively narrow 
definition of social capital employed by e.g., Coleman (1988; 1990) and Woolcock 
(1998): Social capital consists of  
Social relations among agents, resting upon social institutions that 
allow for cooperation and communication.3  
By “social relations”, I mean connections among two or more agents ⎯ in both 
business life and the civic sphere ⎯ that affect behavior (Granovetter, 1973). 
Relations affecting behavior need not be reciprocal, (i.e., they may affect 
different agents in different ways ⎯  one agent may be forced to act due to the 
power distribution in a relation, while another agent may be inspired, but not 
forced, to act because of the information he receives through a relation). 
Relations need not to be direct (intransitive) to be effective, either: Especially in 
the civic sphere, indirect relations ⎯ relations mediated through third parts (e.g. 
friends’ friends) ⎯ may be extremely influential due to the information they 
carry. I shall discuss the nature of social relations in more detail in sections 3 and 
4. 
By “agents”, I mean persons (individuals), but these often represent the 
organizations (firms) in which they are employed. Hence, social capital often 
benefits firms, and the effects upon firms are the focus of discussion.   
Social relations need not be particularly socially beneficial. As shall be evident in 
the discussion in section 5, some types of social relations may lead to collusion 
and economic stagnation. It is only in combination with particular social 
institutions that social relations become valuable and can be seen as “capital”. By 
“social institutions”, I refer to collective traits such as law, social conventions, 
languages, codes, or points of reference, that through regulation or normative or 
cognitive alignment infuse social relations with cooperation and communication.4 
Even if difficult to measure empirically (Abramovitz, 1986; Borgatti et al., 1998; 
Rotberg, 2001), such social relations with cooperation and communication 
arguably lead to social traits mentioned above, such as trust, participation, low 
crime, and so on.  
 
Social capital is non-proprietary  
Some scholars, keen on a methodological individualist stance, view social capital 
as something that can be appropriated by single persons (Burt, 1992; Glaeser, 
2001) or single firms (Gulati, 1999; Lin, 2001). It is true that single persons or 
organizations may benefit from investing in their relations to others ⎯ just as 
they may benefit from investing in other types of capital, such as their 
employees’ skills (Becker, 1964; Schuller, 2001). But focusing only upon single 
agents’ investments in social relations misses a key dimension of social capital. 
Social capital is a powerful concept because it supplements methodologically 
                                          
3 This formulation is mine. Coleman (1988) for example, does not use the term “institutions” like here, 
and in Woolcock (1998), the somewhat catchy phrase “networks and norms” is used to denote what I 
refer to as “relations and institutions”. In the following sections, it will become clear why I choose to 
use this terminology. It should be noted that defining social capital as social relations and institutions 
is at odds with Bordieu’s definition. In Bordieu (1986), he views social capital as resources that result 
from social relations, not the social relations themselves. 
4 The notion of “institution” here is hence not used in a Williamsonian (1985) way, i.e. as a contractual 
arrangement, but as a broader societal environment (North and Thomas, 1973). 
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individualist approaches to economic coordination, such as transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1985; 2000). By pointing towards social capital as an 
institution, a collective, non-proprietary asset of a community of economic 
agents, it helps to explain why individual rational agents make quite different 
choices in different regional settings, and consequently, how economic 
organization may differ between regions ⎯  an explanatory feat that e.g. 
transaction cost economics is not able to pull off on its own.5 This means that the 
social capital approach, by conceptualizing social capital as an asset with 
emergent properties is powerful in explaining economic development differences. 
Exactly because social capital is collective and formed within communities through 
processes of interaction and institutional learning (see section 4) ⎯ , it is an 
unique collective asset which is technically impossible to trade or imitate. Such 
collective assets are those that, if valuable, may form the basis for sustained 
competitive advantage for a community or region. 
In the following, I shall discuss in more detail what is meant with social relations, 
social institutions, cooperation and communication, as well as formation of social 
capital. I begin by sketching out why social capital is economically valuable. 
 
 
3. The Value of Social Capital  
 
It is argued to the point of exhaustion by scholars and policymakers that we are 
entering the Knowledge Economy (e.g., OECD, 1996, Lundvall and Maskell, 2000) 
⎯ an era where competitiveness of firms, nations, and regions is not only based 
upon their efficiencies of producing cheaply and just-in-time, but also upon 
continuous, flexible and cheap creation of knowledge, fostering product and 
process innovation (what we could call technological learning). Large-scale 
manufacturing is being automated and/or outsourced from former industrial 
regions to peripheral regions with low factor costs, small-scale manufacturing 
becomes innovation-based, and new both consumer and supplier industries, 
revolving around product variety and economies of speed, spring up.  
In this era, increasing globalization of demand and production paired with a range 
of changes in facilitating technologies and international institutions bring along a 
host of changes in the organization of economic activity ⎯  particularly in the 
OECD countries, where firms and industries need to change in order to cope with 
new forms of competition. As competitiveness hinges upon efficiencies of learning 
more than the efficiencies of production, firms implement new production 
methods, use different divisions of labor, changing their boundaries accordingly, 
and depend upon other types of institutions in order to coordinate their economic 
activities. It is in this setting that we can best understand the value of social 
capital. Below, I shall outline how particular social relations and social institutions, 
in turn, are valuable in the Knowledge Economy.  
 
The value of social relations 
In economics, the innovation literature is replete with accounts of the interactive 
nature of technological learning. 25 years ago, von Hippel (1988) illustrated how 
firms use customers and suppliers when innovating, and since, a whole literature 
has emerged, treating user-producer innovation, interactive learning, inter-
organizational innovation, and so on (for overviews and discussions, see e.g. 
                                          
5 Williamson (1996) tends to explain social phenomena, such as collaboration and trust, as an 
outcome only of single rational choices of agents, not influenced by social institutions.  
 5 
Lundvall, 1992; Dyer and Singh, 1999; Ingram, 2002). The core argument is, of 
course, that collaborations ⎯ relations ⎯ among firms are drivers of technological 
learning. Firms may receive not only incentives for innovating along the vertical 
dimension of value chains, i.e., from customers and suppliers, but also valuable 
information feeding into the innovation process. Furthermore, the innovation 
literature points out that firms may collaborate horizontally in alliances with other 
firms; or monitor and study their competitors to innovate; and labor flows among 
firms can also be seen as important sources of knowledge transfer. 
Because many World markets are fluctuating and customer demands are 
increasingly ambiguous (or demanding in terms of customization), what is needed 
is not just stable, incremental learning or exploitation, but both exploitation and 
exploration (March, 1991). Such flexible learning necessitates firms to connect to 
a range of diverse knowledge resources and constantly shift collaborations in 
order to learn in both breadth and depth (Lorenzen and Maskell, 2004). 
Consequently, we see how the nature of business relations shifts in an increasing 
number of industries. Whereas earlier efficiencies of production were often 
accomplished through integration or long-term networks, such as stable value 
chains or horizontal alliances, the efficiencies of learning in the Knowledge 
Economy render of increasing economic value a range of different flexible and 
temporary relations among firms ⎯  spanning from the quintessential flexible 
specialization described by Piore and Sabel (1984) to project networks or 
temporary horizontal alliances (see e.g. Hobday 1998; Ekstedt et al. 1999; 
Grabher, 2002; Maskell and Lorenzen 2004). For example, integrated 
pharmaceutical firms have given way to flexible outsourcing arrangements among 
specialized biotech firms, drug developers and drug producers, and integrated 
Hollywood studios have been replaced by complex project networks of small-scale 
film and media production companies. 
Whereas relations among firms are particularly central for innovation in low-tech 
industries, studies of innovation systems (some of which are represented in other 
papers of this book) point to the importance of a range of other relations. For 
example, relations among firms and universities and other public and semi-public 
knowledge centers may be important channels of information and knowledge. 
Particularly for firms in medium- or high-tech industries, university training and 
research is a core input to learning. A range of studies also addresses the 
learning effects of the personal relations among managers and employees from 
different firms: Their collegial exchange of gossip and advise (often based on 
their belonging to the same professions, clubs or associations) may in fact 
constitute an informal trade of information (von Hippel, 1987), or facilitate 
mutual monitoring among firms at the same stage in the value chain (Maskell and 
Lorenzen, 2004). Finally, sociological literature (e.g. Granovetter, 1973) notes 
that personal networks of families and friends that may connect a social entity 
(such as a firm) with the outside world through socialization, exchanges of 
advice, job and technical, and gossip, have important learning effects.  
Figure 1 summarizes these different relations and their value for technological 
learning. 
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Figure 1. Social relations and technological learning effects 
Social relation  Learning effect 
Value chains In-depth user-producer (vertical) learning  
Alliances  Knowledge built jointly (horizontally) 
Flexible specialization  In-breadth learning 
Inter-firm project networks Experimentation and customization 
Industry-schools /universities relations Research and education 
Professions, clubs, associations Informal know-how trade, socialization, gossip 
Families, friendships  Advice, passing on of information 
 
The value of social institutions 
Relations among business firms only lead to technological learning if information 
is exchanged openly and well understood among the participating agents. 
However, while differences between specialized firms are what make their trade 
valuable, providing a potential for mutual learning, the same differences may also 
make such learning very costly. In an economic terminology, differences between 
firms in terms of interests and goals; cultures; organizational designs; as well as 
technologies, may raise coordination problems. There are two basic types of such 
problems (Lorenzen and Foss, 2003). First, differences in firms’ goals and 
interests may cause cooperation problems. Rather than exchanging information 
openly, firms may lie and cheat, hence sacrificing technological learning for other, 
more short-sighted, goals. Second, even if firms are honest and seek to exchange 
information, differences in technologies, organizational designs, cultures, or 
expectations may cause communication problems.  
It is exactly when it is most valuable, i.e. under market uncertainty when demand 
and technological changes makes it necessary for firms to specialize, outsource, 
and learn from each other, that coordination is potentially most difficult. In order 
to overcome these obstacles to learning, firms rely upon a range of coordination 
mechanisms of incentive alignment in order to solve cooperation problems, and 
cognitive alignment in order to facilitate communication. 
However, traditional coordination mechanisms, such as long-term contracts 
(Holmström and Milgrom, 1994; Hart, 1995; and Williamson, 1985; 2000) or 
stable, partner-specific or dyadic trust (Lorenzen, 2002) that have proved 
efficient in a production logic because they lower costs and provide security and 
communication along value chains, are not particularly efficient in a learning 
logic, because they are designed to govern long-term relationships, rather than 
the more flexible and temporary relations needed in the Knowledge Economy. In 
fact, if firms rely on contracts, while at the same time need to connect to a range 
of diverse knowledge resources in order to learn flexibly, they may be faced with 
huge dynamic transaction costs of constantly designing new contracts for shifting 
partners (Langlois and Robertson, 1995).  
With the rise of the Knowledge Economy, other types of coordination mechanisms 
are valuable. What is needed for propagating technological learning are 
mechanisms that, rather that governing closed partnerships and stable networks 
(clubs), in stead organize the market (Maskell and Lorenzen, 2004) and solve 
cooperation and communication problems for a large number of business firms 
that can flexibly connect and reconnect. In other words, whereas business firms 
may solve bilaterally many of their potential coordination problems in their long-
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term relations, their temporary and flexible relations are dependent upon a social 
environment ⎯ social institutions (North & Thomas, 1973).6  
There is a range of social (collective) institutions that may serve to lower 
cooperation problems through aligning incentives, spanning from regulative to 
normative (Scott, 1995). National or international background law (such as trade 
legislation or patent law) is designed to regulate incentives in business relations, 
but such laws are too generic and have too high monitoring and sanctioning costs 
to stand alone in order to coordinate flexible and development-oriented relations. 
This is why, in many contexts, informal social contracts in the guise of social 
conventions (Granovetter, 1982; Taylor, 1982; Elster, 1989) serve to further 
coordinate social interaction, including business transactions, through social 
monitoring, gossip, and reputation effects.7 Such normative social institutions are 
demonstrated to efficiently allow for flexible business relations in different 
contexts (Macaulay, 1963; Lorenzen and Foss, 2003). 
There is also a range of cognitive social institutions that may lower coordination 
problems related to communication (Scott, 1991). In order to understand and 
learn from each other, business firms have to rely on some shared social 
codebooks that allow them to code and interpret information in the same way. 
Such social codebooks consist of shared languages (Lorenzen, 1998; Cowan et 
al., 2000; Lissoni, 2001) and common points of reference or focal points 
(Schelling, 1960) in the guise of shared experiences or myths. Social codebooks 
not only serve to increase firms’ abilities to share information, but can also align 
their expectations about each other. One outcome of such cognitive coordination 
may be social trust, where a whole collective group of agents take mutual 
cooperation for granted, even if they have no direct experience with each other 
(Lorenzen, 2002; Lorenzen and Foss, 2003). Social trust is brought about in a 
cognitive process of automatically ascribing trust to a particular category of 
agents on the basis of their social characteristics, for example, employment, 
training, religion, or simply membership of the same social class or group 
(Fukuyama, 1995).8 
As can be seen, social institutions (such as social conventions and social 
codebooks) are more conductive for learning than dyadic coordination 
mechanisms (such as contracts and partner-specific trust), simply because they 
allow for more ⎯  and more flexible ⎯ relations. But some social institutions may 
also be more conductive for learning than other. Ceteris paribus, cognitive social 
institutions are likely to be better suited for learning than normative institutions: 
When firms align expectations and understand each other well, but are not 
necessarily constrained by narrow schemes for correct behavior which social 
norms would impose upon them, they are open to experiment freely with each 
other, in an intricate web of information-intensive and flexible relations. For 
example, social trust, based upon shared myths or expectations, is collective and 
inclusive to a whole group of people and hence more efficient for flexible relations 
than dyadic trust (which would lock agents into long-lasting relations). Social 
trust is also more efficient for learning than tightly-knit social norms, that would 
limit the types of relations and actions firms could undertake with each other. 
 
                                          
6 While referring to social institutions as an “environment”, North and Thomas (1973) refer to partner-
specific institutions such as contracts or dyadic trust as an “arrangement”. 
7 Elster (1989) uses the notion “norms” instead of “conventions”. 
8 Hence, I view social trust as an outcome of social capital (social ties and institutions), not a part of 
it, as many other authors would have it. 
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4. The Regional Dimension of Social Capital  
 
I have now suggested that social capital consists of social relations in combination 
with the social institutions that facilitate them. I have also made the point that 
flexible relations and cognitive social institutions are particularly valuable as social 
capital. Why, then, is social capital a regional phenomenon? In order to answer 
that question, let us explore the nature of social relations and institutions further.  
 
The Regional Dimension of Social Relations 
A key reason that social capital is often regional is that many social relations, 
and, in particular, combinations of different types of social relations, are place-
bound, because they are interdependent. For my purpose, I discuss two 
dimensions ⎯  and hence, four main types ⎯  of social relations.  
 
Figure 2. Types of Social Relations 
REALM 
NATURE 
Business  Civic  
Tightly coupled Networks: 
Value chains  
Alliances  
 
Strong ties: 
Families, Friendships  
Clubs 
Universities and schools 
Loosely coupled Temporary Organizations: 
Flexible specialization 
Projects 
Weak ties: 
Families’ and Friends’ friends 
Professions 
Associations 
 
The first dimension of social relations (see Figure 2 above) is their realm: The 
business realm vs. the civic realm.9 As business relations are the relations in 
which technological learning and trade takes place, they are also the type of 
relations that, ultimately, produce the most easily recognizable economic results. 
However, a much more abundant type of relations is, of course, relations that are 
established for many other reasons than profit making: Civic relations among 
people in everyday life, knit through kinship; during school days (or reunions); 
through leisure and culture activities; in sports or in volunteer work, and so on. 
The second dimension in Figure 2 is constituted by the nature of social relations: 
Tightly coupled vs. loosely coupled. Tightly coupled (Weick, 1979) relations bond 
agents together in relatively homogenous social groups (Putnam, 2000). Tightly 
coupled relations are direct (with no intermediaries), encompassing frequent 
interactions among the agents involved, they are interdependent (participants are 
likely to influence each other when they act), and often firmly coordinated 
through regulation. In the business realm, this applies to long-term networks 
such as stable value chains and strategic alliances, and in the civic realm to 
strong ties (Granovetter, 1973): Families, long-term friendships, and long-
standing participation to schools/university programs and some types of club 
memberships where people meet frequently and interact directly.  
                                          
9 As can be seen, I juxtapose “civic” with “business”, not with “public”. 
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Loosely coupled (Weick, 1979) relations are fluctuating (on-off) or short-lasting, 
and with relatively little ⎯  or only temporary ⎯ interdependence. They typically 
bridge different social groups that are internally strongly coupled (Putnam, 2000). 
In the business realm, an example of loosely coupled relations is temporary 
market organizations: Business relations that are established quickly and are not 
meant to last, as when a furniture maker buys a shipment of standard 
components or an advertising agency uses a freelance photographer. Loosely 
coupled civic relations are weak ties (Granovetter, 1973): Personal relations that 
are transitive, i.e. mediated through third parts, such as when people have 
common acquaintances (friends’ friends) or because they share membership to 
an association based upon profession or hobby. Giving rise to casual, short-
lasting and flexible interactions, weak ties are able to span the borders between 
the stable and closed relations constituted by strong ties, enriching agents with 
in-breadth information through gossip and opinions ⎯  and occasional favors ⎯ 
that strong ties do not provide them with (Granovetter, 1982).  
Not all four types of social relations are equally sensitive to geographical distance, 
but they are all more abundant locally because those of them that are less 
dependent upon proximity spring from those that are more so. Consequently, we 
see the densest configurations of all these types of relations within relatively 
small geographic areas. Let me explain this in more detail. 
At the heart of the argument is the fact that tightly coupled civic relations ⎯ i.e., 
strong ties ⎯ often are extremely sensitive to distance. This is because they may 
be formally constrained to the geographical catchment area of a club; they may 
radiate from a particular place (such as a school, university, or other organization 
that make people meet and talk); or may depend upon place-specific physical 
artifacts or facilities (a golf course; a lake; or a Rambla). As they are not business 
relations, and has no corporate sponsors sinking investments into maintaining 
them, strong ties hinge upon frequent face-to-face meetings among people in the 
civic sphere, and such meetings are very sensitive to distance costs (Granovetter, 
1982; Becattini, 1990; Brusco, 1992; Lorenzen, 1998) ⎯ to the point where 
Sweeney (1991) refers to the “half-hour [transport time] contact potential”.  
While loosely coupled civic relations (weak ties) should not in themselves be 
sensitive to distance, the above-mentioned distance sensitivity of the tightly 
coupled (strong ties) rubs off upon some of them. Many weak ties are truly 
global. Consider personal relations among immigrants (such as the notorious 
Chinese), able to span all national borders. Or the members of some clubs, who 
will also gladly travel the World to participate in their events. Think of the global 
span and travel activities of Star Trekkies and golf fanatics, or the online 
communities of users of some exclusive software programs. But weak ties spring 
from strong ties. With more friends, there are also more friends’ friends: Friendly 
or family bonds as well as tightly knit networks of university alumni or club 
members recommend people to each other, thus adding “halos” of weak ties to 
the strong ties. This means that strong ties’ sensitivity to geographical distance 
can be traced in the patterns of weak ties: Even if single weak ties have the 
potential of spanning distance, patterns of them have a regional dimension. It 
should of course also be noted that with time, some weak ties develop into strong 
ties. This interdependence of civic relations adds to their regionalization. 
The fact that civic relations are more abundant regionally has a notable effect 
upon business relations. First, let us consider loosely coupled such relations ⎯ 
i.e., temporary organizations. This type of relations is extremely dependent upon 
speed. The furniture maker in the example above is likely to use a local supplier 
in order to minimize delivery time, just as the advertising firm is likely to choose 
a local freelancer, because it is easier and quicker. This need for speed when 
setting up temporary organizations often brings firms to draw upon civic relations 
⎯  strong or weak ties ⎯  in order to identify and contact new suppliers and other 
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partners. Because civic relations are often local, temporary business 
organizations often become local, too.  
Second, the distance sensitivity of civic relations rubs off upon tightly coupled 
business relations ⎯ i.e., networks. This type of social relation is not sensitive to 
distance per se (Maskell and Lorenzen, 2004). Due to the direct and easily 
recognizable economic benefit of business relations, firms often sink asset-
specific investments (Williamson 1985) into them, and are thus willing to pay 
transport costs and communication costs (which are diminishing anyway, due to 
new technologies) plus costs of travel and personnel exchanges, associated to 
maintaining them (Gertler, 1995; Andersen, 1999). The type of business relations 
that firms are bound to be most willing to invest in and pay distance costs for, are 
tightly coupled business relationships, such as strategic partnerships or long-term 
supplier relations. For example, General Motors thinks little of paying for airfare 
to maintain relations to Daewoo in Korea, and Italian and German suppliers of 
machine tools constantly travel the World to service their customers. The fact is 
that, after being established, tightly coupled business relations may (seemingly 
paradoxically) demand relative rare face-to-face meetings between agents, and, 
if the relation is tightly enough coupled, communication technology may 
substitute for much face-to-face contact. But nevertheless, many business 
networks are still regionalized. Some of them may be facilitated by universities or 
public agencies that operate with geographically defined catchment areas. But 
more notably, many business relations also spring from civic ⎯  and hence 
regional ⎯ relations among managers. This means that a great deal of them 
continue to be local, even with increasing global opportunities for trade and 
outsourcing. Adding to the regionalization of business networks is the fact that 
they sometimes spring from regionally abundant loosely coupled business 
relations that develop into long-term value chains or alliances.  
Figure 3 sums up how, due to the interdependencies described above, many 
different social relations are regionalized. 
 
Figure 3. Regionalization of social relations 
REALM 
NATURE 
Business  Civic  
Tightly coupled Networks: 
Not sensitive to distance per se ⎯  but 
more abundant in regions because 
they spring from civic relations and 
temporary organizations 
Strong ties: 
Highly sensitive to distance because 
they depend upon face-to-face contact 
 
Loosely coupled Temporary organizations: 
Highly sensitive to distance 
because they depend upon speed 
Weak ties: 
Not sensitive to distance per se ⎯  but 
more abundant in regions because they 
spring from strong ties 
  
 
Consider a matrix with a dense configuration of tightly coupled as well as loosely 
coupled, business-related as well as civic relations. Such a matrix of relations 
has, ceteris paribus, optimal learning effects, as it holds a wide variety of 
opportunities for forming still new types of flexible business relations with 
learning effects in breadth and in depth. And such a matrix is also very likely to 
be regional, because of the interdependencies of the relation types. Because 
many business relations depend upon civic relations, and many weak ties depend 
upon strong ties, the distance sensitivity of civic relations and strong ties rubs off 
upon business relations and weak ties, and they often also take on a distinct 
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regional dimension. We may speak of a Regional Matrix of Social Relations. 
Simply speaking, it is only in regions we find, within the same group of firms and 
people, interconnected relations pertaining to money, to work, to sport, and to a 
thousand other issues ⎯ some relations tight and long-lasting, others inspiring 
and loose. 
 
The Regional Dimension of Institutions 
A further reason that social capital is often confined to regions is that social 
institutions are also often regional. Quite simply, most regulative institutions, 
such as laws and rules applied by regional or city governments, universities, 
clubs, etc., have a defined geographical scope. For example, contract law, police 
codes rules, and membership rules apply to countries, counties and buildings, 
respectively. Cognitive institutions may also be place-bound, because they refer 
to local artifacts (e.g. buildings or sights). Without noticing it, we tend behave in 
particular ways when we dine in the club, or walk the Rambla. But a more 
profound reason that social institutions are regional is that they not only serve to 
facilitate social relations, they are also themselves created in social relations. Just 
as matrices of social relations facilitate technological learning, they also facilitate 
institutional learning. The results of such processes, in which groups of agents 
have interacted repeatedly, are normative and cognitive institutions. Social norms 
and codebooks have arisen as a result of regional problems, been tried out on 
regional problems, and adapted over time to facilitate regional coordination 
(Lorenzen and Foss, 2003). Even if Silicon Valley is very different from a North 
Italian textile district in terms of market context, both regions take advantage of 
coordination among local firms made possible by an intricate local system of 
regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions which has evolved through 
decades. Thus, institutional learning processes create communities, and because 
learning is most efficient in matrices of social relations that are densest within 
regions, communities become regional. For example, Elster (1989) analyzes how 
conventions arise and function in nation states and regional communities, and 
even if Holzner’s (1972) original notion of communities coordinated by shared 
cognitive institutions ⎯  epistemic communities ⎯  was placeless and Haas 
(1989) analyzes such communities (in the guise of business professionals) in a 
global context, there is ample evidence that many cognitive institutions and 
epistemic communities revolved around them are regional (Pyke et al, 1992; 
Braczyk et all, 1998; Lazaric and Lorenz, 1998; Keeble and Wilkinson, 2000; 
Lorenzen and Foss, 2003; Amin and Cohendet, 2005). 
Because many social institutions are learned in social relations, they evolve 
regionally, but they also only function regionally, by virtue of regional social 
relations. For example, social conventions and reputation effects are only efficient 
if there are ample weak ties to spread around gossip, and sufficient strong ties to 
facilitate social sanctions towards community members who breach social 
conventions. In a regional setting, there is not only a high number of both weak 
and strong ties, but also a finite number of agents, meaning better possibilities 
for identifying malefactors (Casson, 1997) and sanctioning them (Taylor, 1982). 
Whether a region’s industry is low-tech and decentralized as in traditional 
industrial districts, or revolves around dominant firms or a university environment 
as in Cambridge, industry agents know each other and know of each other in the 
local industrial “village”. 
Hence, we find particularly rich varieties of both social relations and institutions 
only in regions. It is true that most countries show an abundance of both 
business and civic interaction among people at the national level. It is also true 
that globalization has brought about new types of business-oriented as well as 
civic global communities. However, no such global, or even national, community 
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can match a region’s dense matrix of subcontracting, strategic alliances, informal 
know-how exchanges, plus interactions in employers’ associations and in labor 
unions, in football clubs, at golf courses, or in the local pub or in the street ⎯ 
underpinned by unique local dialects and proverbs, local myths, and local gossip 
and reputation effects. The potential regional wealth of such social capital, and 
hence, the regional scope for learning, is unique.  
 
 
5. The Dynamics of Social Capital 
 
While the greatest scope for social capital and learning is regional, firms in some 
regions have a modest learning rate and fall behind in the Knowledge Economy. 
Clearly, while a regional setting is necessary for social capital formation, it is not 
sufficient. In the following, I shall discuss why not all regions are equally rich in 
social capital.  
 
Some Regions Lack Social Capital 
One reason for a region being relatively poor in social capital may be a poverty of 
social relations. For example, in the business realm, if dominant (“flagship”) firms 
set up and top-down coordinate supplier networks, relations may be few and all 
of them tightly coupled. Many scale-intensive industries, like shipbuilding, have 
thus been characterized by non-reciprocal business relations and “star”-type 
value chains (all directed at one customer), but such patters also seem to arise in 
a range of newer and more knowledge-intensive industries that become 
coordinated by system houses or a few dominant distributors. In all these cases, 
the potential for interactive learning and experimentation across value chains is 
limited. Another reason for a lack of relations or a dominance of tightly coupled 
relations may simply be that an economic downturn has eradicated many 
business relations, as in the case of shipbuilding in many OECD regions. A lack of 
(venture) capital may also serve to hold down the number of business relations ⎯ 
clearly, in many cases social capital needs to be funded by financial capital 
(Lorenzen, 2001). In the civic realm, relations may be fewer and mostly 
benefiting a limited number of privileged insiders, if closed exclusive clubs 
dominate leisure and society life. Extreme examples are how the church and very 
closed and exclusive guilds have restricted and regimented social as well as 
economic activities in some societies. The result of such a dominance of a few 
tightly coupled social relations is collusion and little and slow learning 
(technological as well as institutional), serving to reproduce yesterday’s 
technologies and old-fashioned traditions (Putnam, 2000; Florida, 2002).10 
A region may also be rich in social relations, but poor in institutions. Some 
regions experience institutional learning through social relations, but rather than 
leading to socially beneficial institutions that promote openness and dynamism, 
hence facilitating further institutional learning in a cumulative causation (and, of 
course, also facilitating technological learning), institutional learning processes in 
these regions have amounted to misunderstandings and failed experiments with 
openness and collaboration. In game theoretic terminology, we could say that 
such regions where institutions both impede collaboration and social learning 
have reached a low institutional equilibrium, compared to an equilibrium with 
                                          
10 Whereas Putnam (2000) refer to the dominance of tightly coupled relations as “negative” social 
capital, I simply call it a lack of social capital. 
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socially beneficial and self-reinforcing social institutions (Lorenzen, 2002).11 In 
the case of a low institutional equilibrium, conventions and expectations prevent 
cooperation and communication rather than facilitate it, and consequently, social 
relations are replete with distrust (which is different from and more costly than a 
lack of trust) and misunderstandings (which are more costly than a lack of 
communication). The dominance of the mafia and the general suspicion, hate, 
and economic and institutional sclerosis this has brought about in some South 
Italian regions is a case in point (Putnam, 1993).  
How may we explain, then, that some regions do manage to build social capital? 
When is a positive causation between social relations and institutional learning set 
in motion? Let us look into the processes in which social capital comes about. I 
shall distinguish between organic processes of social capital accumulation and 
strategic (or, at least, politically influenced) processes of social capital 
investments. 
 
Accumulation of Social Capital  
As social capital is a complex collective system of social relations and institutions, 
it is created in organic, collective, and market-driven processes. Some scholars 
(e.g. Kristensen, 1992; Putnam, 1995) suggest that social capital accumulation is 
a process that may well take many decades, and be deeply rooted in earlier 
institutions in the regional institutional sediment that may well be a century old. 
While it is likely that institutions do have a history and often build upon or draw 
analogies from earlier institutions (Lorenzen and Foss, 2003), it may be too 
conservative to suggest that accumulation of social capital takes decades or 
centuries: New industrial spaces (Scott, 1998), from high-tech Silicon Valleys to 
North European low-tech clusters, are examples of regions that accumulated 
developed and accumulated social capital much quicker.  
While social capital accumulation may thus happen in course of a decade or two, 
it may take external shocks (such as market developments or technological 
shifts) to set the process in motion. Experimenting with setting up both business 
and civic relations where few abounded earlier, and learning new institutions and 
practices, can be set off by a strong market pull or push (Lorenzen, 1998; OECD, 
2001; Lorenzen and Foss, 2003). Hence (even this is likely to be of little comfort 
to policymakers), chance is bound to play an important role for social capital 
accumulation in many regions. But key agents may also spur the accumulation 
process. One example is “grand old men”, early-moving entrepreneurs, the firms 
of whom both create a regional demand for subsuppliers and spin off new firms 
by employing and training people who later embark upon own ventures. Another 
example is younger, but visionary entrepreneurs, who through large, symbolic 
ventures (such as big malls, museums, hotels, or the like) inspire others to 
conduct their own, independent, economic experiments. Through such early 
events, whether they be induced by chance or created by key regional agents, an 
initial stock of social capital can breed more social capital: It stimulates 
technological learning and economic success, which may build confidence in the 
very strategies of interacting, openness, and learning, hence inspiring still new 
local agents to building social relations and interacting. 
  
Investments in Social Capital 
While social capital is built through organic, bottom-up accumulation, public 
authorities and policymaking may also play a vital role in setting this process in 
                                          
11 Of course, “equilibrium” is meant as a metaphor for a particular type of development path (Arthur, 
1990). No social system ⎯  and least of all a region ⎯  can be said to be at rest. 
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motion. It is a misconception to define the civic as “the non-public”, and to view 
social relations with public participation as a less important constituent of social 
capital. It is equally wrong that private agents always benefit social capital 
accumulation more than public agents. In fact, public policymaking is often 
important for social capital creation, because in some cases, it takes deliberate 
investments ⎯ which may only be undertaken or at least coordinated by public 
agents ⎯ to create social relations or set off institutional learning. Let us look at 
these types of investments in turn. 
First, if social relations are few and reciprocity is modest (relations are 
predominantly tightly coupled, serve dominant agents’ interests, and information 
and goods do not flow freely but rather along directions set by dominant agents), 
public action may be necessary to “loosen” social relations. If public policymakers 
design rules for tenders in subcontracting, offer public tenders, or offer incentives 
for outsider entrepreneurs to build new business relations among themselves in 
order to challenge dominant firms and possibly short-circuit their relations, 
relations within the region can be de-monopolized. The public may also play an 
important role in boosting civic relations related to leisure, culture, and various 
unions and associations.  
There is also an important role for the public to play in regions with very few 
relations to the outside world. While regions are typically open systems (Braczyk 
et al, 1998) in terms of flows of goods and fiscal capital, it is still an open 
question of how open they are (or should be) in terms of people and social capital 
flows. Some regions have built social relations among a limited group of agents 
with local origin and formed social institutions in predominantly closed local 
learning and investment processes, forming social capital bases that typically 
support traditional industries. For such regions that experience social as well as 
economic stability and maintain an acceptable rate of technological learning 
(expressed in exports) within traditional industries, the role of the public may well 
be to ensure stability and preserve the regional way of life. This type of social 
capital, and the policy challenge that comes with it, is characteristic of many 
traditional industrial districts, e.g. in North Italy. However, other regions 
demonstrate quite another logic. The high social capital stocks of Silicon Valley, 
Cambridge, and several Canadian regions, demonstrate that a region may have a 
surprising capacity for successfully integrating a high number of immigrants into 
a regional system of social relations and institutional learning. Hence, the role of 
policymakers who want to invest in and protect stocks of social capital is hardly to 
close a region to outside influences, competences, and people, but rather to invite 
and propagate them, without undermining social stability and institutional 
learning, destabilizing social relations and dismantling social institutions. 
Second, apart from addressing the social relations issue, a further role for 
policymaking is to facilitate institutional unlearning. This is necessary if industrial 
history has resulted in a low institutional equilibrium of conventions of non-
cooperation, as described above. In a game-theoretic perspective, a low 
institutional equilibrium can be viewed as one out of two possible outcomes of a 
reciprocal (or Tit-for-Tat) game (Axelrod, 1984). If an agent cheats and 
everybody else reciprocates by cheating, the game ends in a low equilibrium, but 
if just one agent puts himself at risk and cooperates, other agents reciprocate by 
cooperating, thus pushing the equilibrium “upwards”. In a region low on social 
capital, such a first cooperative move would, ideally, trigger an institutional 
learning process that will eventually redesign social conventions into cooperation 
(ultimately facilitating further institutional learning and social capital 
accumulation). The public can be that one agent that dares to cooperate first, in 
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order to set off a cumulative process of institutional learning.12 One way for 
policymakers to set off a new regional “game” by playing “Cooperate” first can be 
public-private partnerships.  
A relatively simple type of public investment in regional social capital is a large-
scale construction project, as it may serve to create both a initial stock of social 
relations that spur further tie-building, plus act as artifact and symbol, creating a 
cognitive point of reference or even a myth that lays the foundation for later 
institution-building (OECD, 2001). The bridge built across the Swedish/Danish 
Øresund region, the Bluewater shopping centre built as a part of the regeneration 
of Kent Thames-side, or the museum and other cultural tourist attractions built in 
Bilbao are examples of attempts of investing in, among other things, regional 
social capital. It is noteworthy, however, that not any large-scale prestige project 
will serve as a social capital investment. Many such large-scale projects incur few 
firms, spin-offs or social relations, as well as limited legitimacy, common interest, 
or institution-building. Hence, they are likely to remain short-term investments in 
personal prestige and political careers rather than long-term investments in social 
capital. 
 
The Role of the Nation State 
A basic role of the nation state has always been to form a foundation for the 
development of social capital at all national geographical levels. As mentioned, 
financial capital sometimes spurs social capital, and national industry funds are 
often needed to support the formation of new business relations through start-
ups. It also takes a nation to fight poverty, and belief in government has been 
and still is a crucial foundation, upon which social conventions of cooperation may 
rest (Lundvall and Maskell, 2000; Maskell, 2001).13 This role of the state is not at 
all trivial, which huge persisting national differences in social capital stocks 
demonstrate. 
But there may be a further role for the state related to the formation of social 
capital: To boost regional policymaking processes, inspiring and forcing regions 
with a low stock of social capital to invest in it. Even if the cumulative causation 
among social capital, economic growth, and public investments (meaning that 
even a modest initial investment in social capital may hugely influence a region’s 
later economic performance) should make it very attractive for regional 
policymakers to invest in social capital, there are often barriers to such 
investments. Regional policymakers are often too locked in to particular policies 
(for instance, avoiding public-private partnerships) or lacking of strategic 
thinking, involvement or legitimacy, to efficiently invest in social capital. Put 
simply, there may be a need for institutional unlearning at the regional policy 
level. 
Global economic or political shocks can sometimes be conductive for setting off a 
regional policy process of investing in social capital (OECD, 2001). However, 
there is also great scope for national policymaking here. For example, the Danish 
national planning law has for 50 years demanded all Danish regions (counties) to 
present plans for economic and social development. The latter years’ increased 
planning pull has forced these regions to identifying their key economic strengths 
and weaknesses and presenting coherent strategies for tackling them through 
economic, spatial, as well as social policies. The pending regional reform (where 
                                          
12 Of course, this strategy hinges upon other regional agents to play as Axelrod (1984) predicts: 
Reciprocally. 
13 Putnam's (1993) explanatory model can be criticized for its lack of state agency (Tarrow 1996; 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). 
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municipalities are merged and regions are changed) is bound to spur this regional 
planning and investment process further. Moreover, regions compete for national 
funds for selected technology areas through setting up regional consortia, and 
this has forced regional agents, private as public, to collaborate and form new 
types of social relations. Similar competitions among German länder (e.g., for 
Biotech funds) have brought about new regional collaborations and institutions 
(OECD, 2001). 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has aimed at contributing to our understanding of localized learning 
though looking at why what may be seen as society’s most basic social 
infrastructure for learning ⎯ social capital ⎯ often is a regional phenomenon. The 
paper has argued that in the Knowledge Economy, social capital “finances” 
knowledge and skill assets, and the paper has uncovered how social capital ⎯ 
defined as a matrix of four types of social relations plus institutions facilitating 
cooperation and communication ⎯ is a necessary precondition for localized 
learning. The paper further suggested that social capital is a predominantly 
regional phenomenon, because it is at the regional level weak and strong; as well 
as civic and professional relations, come together to facilitate institutional 
learning processes. Only with a certain stock of social capital, allowing for 
cooperation and communication, may a region be able to socially “finance” 
technological learning. Social capital hence bears the potential for turning a 
region into, if you will, a “learning region” (Hudson, 1999; OECD, 2001; Rutten et 
al., 2006). 
Even if formation of social capital is a bottom-up process of building social 
relations and institutional learning, it lends an important role for public policy at 
regional as well as national levels ⎯  through both finance, public investments, 
public-private partnerships, and symbolic and regulative efforts. There seems to 
be a division of labor of social capital policies: Whereas regional policymakers 
may need to invest in social capital formation through public projects, formation 
of public-private partnerships, influencing the nature of local relations, and 
opening the region to external influences, national policymakers may provide 
background law and finance opportunities while provoking or otherwise moving 
regional policymakers to engage in social capital investments. 
Research into Learning Regions has so far  ⎯  quite naturally ⎯  drawn heavily 
upon the research fields of, on one hand, Economic Geography (e.g., Romer, 
1986; Krugman, 1991; Fujuta et al., 1999), and, on the other hand, Regional 
Studies (e.g., Brazyck et al, 1998; Cooke and Piccaluga, 2004). However, coming 
from a mainstream economic research tradition, Economic Geography has a 
tendency to treat innovation and knowledge spillovers as phenomena that can be 
studied independently from the firms and other agents who bring them about. 
Furthermore, even if Regional Studies is now booming with studies of (and 
arguments about) knowledge-creating business firms and organizations (such as 
universities), many such studies often pay little more than lip service to the social 
embeddedness of business relations in civic society.  
Digging into the problem of social capital clearly supplements these two research 
streams. Hence, the social capital angle is an important constituent of an 
emerging theory of localized learning, as scrutinizing social capital’s constituents 
⎯ social relations and social institutions ⎯ reveals why so many learning 
processes are inherently regional. Furthermore, it uncovers the processes that 
are at the base of technological and institutional learning, hence facilitating a type 
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of policy discussion that is so far relatively rare within the discourse on localized 
learning ⎯ or, for that matter, Economic Geography and Regional Studies. 
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